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**Intelligence Community Statement by Robert M. Gates
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
28 February 1984**

Mr. Chairman:

I. The National Intelligence Topics (NITs) Process

In 1978, the NITs replaced the Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) as a forum for identifying substantive areas in which there are critical information needs and for providing guidance to intelligence collectors and producers. From the Intelligence Community's perspective, however, the usefulness of the NITs was reduced by the nature of the questions posed by the policymakers and by the lack of a mechanism that would provide an opportunity for both the policymakers and intelligence managers to discuss on a regular basis the adequacy of intelligence support on topics of priority concern. In addition, the NIT process was too slow, cumbersome, and inflexible to be of significant and mutual benefit to producers and consumers. As a result, policymakers and some intelligence managers were reluctant to participate in and support the NIT process.

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In 1982, the DCI recognized the limitations in the NIT process and took steps to remedy them. To make the formal process simpler and more dynamic, Mr. Casey directed that the NIT-process be modified to include the establishment of a SIG(I) Committee to meet quarterly to review current requirements and review the adequacy of intelligence support for the policy process; the preparation of an annotated list of CIA, DIA, INR and NIC publications tying specific publications to the relevant NIT; and the preparation by the Intelligence Producers Council of a periodic report listing significant gaps in US knowledge of each NIT subject.

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The quarterly SIG meetings facilitated a candid, ongoing dialogue regarding the adequacy of intelligence support to the policy process. The dialogue also elicited comments on the need for more fine tuning of the NIT process. To address these needs, the IPC at the direction of the SIG(I) Committee Chairman, recommended, and the SIG implemented, having two, rather than four, SIG(I) Committee meetings a year; identifying two categories of NITs -- one (identified as Category A) requiring reporting within six months, the second (Category B) within twelve months; enhancing the specificity of the NIT questions by listing appropriate sub-topics under each of the main topics; and providing Committee members a listing of significant information gaps preventing complete responses.

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We continue to explore ways to enhance the utility of this process, principally through improving the intelligence policymaker dialogue. Additionally, for the first time, we are conscientiously planning research programs with the NITs in mind. Both the 1983 and 1984 DI research programs, for example, relate each research issue to specific NITs. [REDACTED]

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NIT-Related Production

Let me now turn to the guidance provided by policy elements in the FY 1983 and FY 1984 NITs of current interest and describe the Community's responsiveness to the guidance in terms of NIT-related production. I will be brief inasmuch as we have provided the Committee Staff with a great deal of background information, including lists of Community production on each individual NIT for 1983 and thus far in 1984. [REDACTED]

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The NITs of current interest disseminated in September 1982 were longer and more comprehensive than those for previous years. The topics focused on substantive issues from the previous year's NITs that remained valid and ongoing, particularly in areas where our knowledge was incomplete. They also included new topics (e.g., Soviet intelligence policy and activities, Soviet leadership succession, terrorism directed against US interests, Soviet negotiating strategies in START, Argentine foreign policy and political alliances) of concern to the consumers. Overall, some 700 individual reports relating to

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the FY 1983 NITs were published and disseminated. The NIT-related production provided either complete or substantial coverage for nearly 60 percent of the NITs.

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In terms of substantive coverage, intelligence reporting related to NIT questions on the USSR and Latin America was the most extensive.

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Community Responsiveness to the FY 1984 NITs.

The NIT inputs submitted by SIG(I) Committee principals for the FY 1984 NITs (that is, guidance for the period October 1983 to October 1984) are more specific and detailed in content than those in recent years. They reflect high consumer interest in Soviet foreign, economic, and military policies; technology transfer from the West to the USSR and its allies; growing instability in the Middle East and Central America; and the activities of hostile intelligence services and the plans and capabilities of terrorist groups, especially their potential for nuclear terrorism. There were no regional topics submitted for Eastern Europe or Africa. [REDACTED]

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The Community has had only a limited time to respond to the new policy guidance which was issued in late September 1983. In many instances there are projects scheduled for later in FY 1984 that will provide focused and in-depth reporting on those topics. More important, there are significant information gaps that will preclude a full or satisfactory response to some topics in the near term. I will discuss those gaps in greater detail after summarizing the NIT-related production. [REDACTED]

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For the period 1 September to 15 February, over 400 intelligence reports and articles (some reporting covered more than one topic) responsive to the current NITs were produced and

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disseminated. In terms of the substantive coverage, NIT-related production thus far in FY 1984 is most extensive on the USSR, including Soviet planning with respect to the employment of strategic and conventional forces in a theater role (NIT 7); the conventional war readiness of Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces (NIT 8); and Soviet RDT&E initiatives and their impact on military policy/doctrine (NIT 9). [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In general, substantive coverage of global issues was less extensive particularly on those subjects related to international trade and finance (NITs 22 and 23); international energy (NITs 24 and 25); and international narcotics (NIT 27). Political intelligence reporting on foreign leaders and factions (NITs 30 and 31) was also quite limited. Increased coverage in all the substantive areas that I just mentioned should result from the completion of a number of intelligence assessments during the remainder of the fiscal year. [REDACTED]

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Even after the completion of planned research projects, there will likely remain some NITs for which there will be no full or satisfactory response. Significant information gaps are likely to preclude such responses in the near term. The IPC has

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alerted SIG(I) Committee principals to those gaps and the topics related to them. In addition, the DDCI has disseminated the listing of significant information gaps to appropriate Community entities (for example, the DCID 1/2 Committee, COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, HUMINT Committee) and has requested them to take ~~action where possible to stimulate or initiate corrective~~ efforts. These entities will provide an accounting of ongoing collection activities or actions newly taken against those information gaps to the IPC, which will prepare a status report for the SIG(I) Committee. [REDACTED]

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The listing that the DDCI has disseminated within the Community reflects the fact that information gaps exist for nearly all the NIT questions. Information gaps in some of the substantive areas are more fundamental and pervasive than in others and they are likely to have the greatest impact on the Community's ability to support consumers. Some examples of substantive areas and topics that fall in this category include:

- the impact of arms control strategy on Soviet military force structure;
- plans and policies for strategic conflict with the US, particularly those relating to intentions and plans for the wartime use of space;

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- Soviet low-observables technology and its application for strategic and conventional attack forces;
- Soviet intentions to establish a permanent military presence in the Caribbean;
- Soviet strategy and plans to undermine existing Latin American regimes;
- specifics on intentions, plans, leadership, and locations of terrorist groups;
- and Syrian intentions and objectives in the Middle East. [REDACTED]

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The examples I have just presented are illustrative of some of the serious information gaps that we in the Intelligence Community must confront. Many of the gaps will be difficult to fill. Improved and/or more focused technical collection might narrow some gaps but most of the hard evidence needed will depend on the acquisition of well-placed HUMINT sources. [REDACTED]

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II. The Coming Data Explosion

The data available to intelligence analysts has tripled in the last seven years. It will triple again by 1988, and we estimate it will triple once more between then and the early 1990s. Substantial improvements are planned for every source of data:

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New collection programs will also offer significant qualitative improvements:

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The acquisition of these data will pose unique challenges to our analytic organizations. Even though we believe we are now realistically taking account of the coming data explosion, we nevertheless are well behind where we should be. This problem is compounded by the rapid technological progress being made in data handling hardware and software, so that as systems to handle our current needs become operational we find that these capabilities are already obsolescent and in fact will probably not satisfy our needs five years hence. [REDACTED]

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Having opened with this somewhat pessimistic statement -- and a touch of pessimism seems to be realistic when discussing computers -- the Intelligence Community is making real progress in this field. Practical and effective ADP applications are being made and are planned across the entire NFIP. [REDACTED]

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Analysis and ReportingCIA

SAFE, the joint CIA-DIA information handling system for production analysts, has been very successful since its redirection. Initial operations began in March 1983, and about 350 analysts at CIA and 130 analysts at DIA now have access to the system. Improvements in efficiency are commonplace: analysts can get their mail delivered faster, they can review it more easily and they can save it with a minimum of trouble. In this relatively brief period, analysts have developed unique and unexpected techniques for taking advantage of SAFE's capabilities. [REDACTED]

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Despite these advances, the capabilities of SAFE today are substantially less than those envisioned in 1977. Assuming terminals are installed at double the current rate, full operational capability will not be achieved until 1988 -- four years later than was projected then. Furthermore, our analytic responsibilities have grown substantially, and the quality of data has substantially exceeded the level projected for SAFE in 1977. [REDACTED]

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In reviewing SAFE and other existing or potential ADP applications, we have identified a number of shortcomings that need to be addressed: [REDACTED]

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- Current terminals display less than half a page of text at a time, and they are slow or hard to use.
- More efficient data search and retrieval is needed.
- Data bases often are not arrayed in a form needed directly to support analysis.
- Many sources of information are not accessible via SAFE. [REDACTED]

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To deal with these challenges, a mechanism was needed to develop a set of plans and requirements. I have established a Task Force for the DI that is focusing on key issues related to handling the large flow of data expected over the next decade. This Task Force is working closely with the Executive Director's Information System Board and with the Information Handling Committee of the IC Staff. [REDACTED]

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The DI Task Force is assessing the implications of future data and display requirements on the Agency's need for an upgraded communications system and on the Office of Data Processing's Plans for ADP improvements. Based on evaluations of DI requirements and ongoing projects in the R&D community, the Task Force is developing an integrated plan for improvements for the 1986-88 timeframe. To ensure that this plan is realized, it

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will be necessary to reprogram some funds for development activities in FY 1984 and FY 1985. For example, we will need to fund development of electronic data transfer to the NSC Crisis Management Facility. In addition, we will present a new initiative in FY 1986 to undertake advanced development work.

[REDACTED]

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DoD

Within the DoD, ADP and related telecommunications capabilities supporting GDIP activities and US operating forces are provided by the worldwide DoD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS). DoD operating commands, service intelligence commands, and service S&T intelligence centers are internettted through a rudimentary digital data network known as the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS), which is planned for upgrading. Operational DODIIS subsystems support all phases of intelligence activity from identification of collection requirements through the dissemination of finished intelligence products. [REDACTED]

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The Joint National Intelligence Dissemination Systems (JNIDS) is a joint Army, Navy, Air Force and DIA Program, with Navy as the executive agent. JNIDS will define user requirements, develop and test procedures, and identify ADP capabilities necessary to improve the integration of SIGINT, imagery and intelligence data from other sensor systems. [REDACTED]

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DIA's share of the joint CIA-DIA SAFE program is designed to improve support to DIA and Defense intelligence analysts, provide improved automated tools to assist analysis of data, and provide more rapid recall, update, and comprehensive search of data bases and work files. Beginning development in FY 1985, the DIA Advanced Technology Base will provide the internal architectural alternatives and technical design standards to permit incorporation of SAFE and the DIA time-sensitive ADP support operations into an integrated architecture to satisfy the processing and analytic support requirements in the 1990s. [REDACTED]

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Data Processing and Exploitation

The Intelligence Community is developing information systems to support the exploitation of data gathered by the new intelligence collection programs. This link between collection and analysis is needed to ensure the balance of the overall effort. [REDACTED]

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Imagery

To keep pace with the anticipated increases in imagery exploitation requirements, NPIC has initiated several upgrade programs designed to provide the necessary exploitation and support capabilities through this decade. Details have been provided in a report from NPIC to the SSCI in December 1983. The NPIC Upgrade Program totals more than \$800 million and calls for

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the installation [REDACTED] that will
serve as "fusion centers" to integrate the various analytic
responsibilities of imagery analysts. [REDACTED]

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Within the Department of Defense the Advanced Imagery
Requirements and Exploitation System (AIRES II) is being
developed which, working in conjunction with CAMS II and the NPIC
Data System (NDS II), will support DoD processing of national
imagery tasking, collection, exploitation and reporting. [REDACTED]

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SIGINT

Existing SIGINT processing capabilities are not keeping pace
with the increasing amounts of SIGINT data being received, which
place overwhelming demands on data forwarding, distribution and
processing systems in terms of increased volume and complexity as
well as timeliness. Within the CCP a vast array of ADP
capabilities are being developed. [REDACTED]

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HUMINT

More effective and efficient information handling technology is also being developed to support human source collection activities. The modernization of FBIS is being continued to provide processing and production capabilities to satisfy US needs for access to the foreign media and other open sources of information. [REDACTED] enhance the security of information in the field and increase the speed with which we can communicate intelligence to CIA headquarters.

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III. External Research: The Community Approach

In July 1983 the Intelligence Producers Council, under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence, established a forum for the exchange of information on intelligence-related external research. The purpose of this forum is fourfold:

- (1) To ensure that senior production managers, as well as analysts and other interested officials, become aware of the kinds of studies that are being proposed and in progress throughout the Community, and that are available through the library system.
- (2) To ensure that production managers have an opportunity to make thoughtful decisions on whether to initiate or continue a project, to participate in a joint effort with other organizations, to modify a contract to complement other work in progress, or to terminate or suspend a contract in light of work accomplished by another organization.
- (3) To encourage a more active dialogue among participants at all levels in the production process.
- (4) To increase the volume of contract studies available through various repositories.

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Participation in this forum includes CIA, DIA, NSA, State/INR, the four military services, the IC Staff, and the five DCI Production Committees. The Director of DoD Contract Studies and Management Services is periodically consulted on matters such as non-NFIP intelligence research and the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Information on intelligence-related research topics sponsored by the Department of Energy and the Defense Nuclear Agency is made available to the participants.

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The process for information exchange involves preparation and distribution of periodic status reports (monthly, quarterly, or semiannually depending on the program manager) of ongoing or recently completed studies. Points of contact are included to encourage dialogues among interested analysts, COTRS, or managers. CBBB pages are forwarded to the participants to ensure that all managers are aware of proposals submitted for funding.

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Although this Community-wide process is still developing, there is every indication that it will be a very successful mechanism for the improvement of communications, resource management, and production. Dialogues among analysts have been active. Periodic Community working group sessions are convened to discuss or coordinate research in such areas as foreign aerospace weapons R&D, Soviet defense industries and Soviet processes and resources. One CIA project was suspended pending

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the completion of a State Department contract (country trade practices). [REDACTED]

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CIA also participates in a number of regularly funded joint contract projects that involve the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State. Research studies range from nuclear proliferation studies with Energy-funded laboratories, the Land Armaments and Manpower Model (LAMM) with DIA and Army, studies on Warsaw Pact Defense Expenditures and Soviet weapons costing with DIA, space systems analysis with USAF, and a political paper on the West Bank with State. [REDACTED]

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More studies are becoming more useful because of greater awareness on the part of analysts. CIA occasionally is able to take advantage of contract efforts prepared under the sponsorship of other Departments. In these cases, we complement work being done in areas such as foreign weapon systems characteristics, weapon stockpile requirements, and chemical weapons proliferation through our own internal research program. [REDACTED]

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As a matter of general interest, there are about 200 research projects in progress sponsored by CIA, DIA, and State/INR. Of these, almost half focus on scientific and technical matters or sophisticated weapon systems analyses. Most of the balance address political, general military, and economic issues. [REDACTED]

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An important element of our external analysis, especially on weapons-related issues, is its competitive aspect. CIA, for example, intentionally uses different contractors than FTD or MIA or DIA (and vice versa) so that we genuinely are approaching key problems independently, even if we use the same data. This competitive analysis strategy has strong support in the Community, the Executive Branch, and, we believe, in the Congress. [REDACTED]

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Statement by Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
28 February 1984

Mr. Chairman:

The FY-85 program for the Directorate of Intelligence is the third year of a five-year effort (I) to strengthen CIA's analytic capability and (II) to enable it to exploit new collection capabilities.

I. The need to strengthen our analytic capability has been the result of a long term, gradual decline in the analytical resources of the Directorate, a broad range of new requirements, and the need to improve the quality of its analysis. Without belaboring a point that I have made each of the last two years, the dismantling of CIA's efforts on the Third World and severe cutbacks in our efforts on the Soviet Union (and most particularly on defense and defense related industries) represented areas where we needed to restore capabilities largely lost.

The need to strengthen the Directorate also was occasioned by the expansion of requirements placed upon us by policymakers. This involved the need for new resources to deal

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with a whole series of new problems that the Directorate faces now and will face increasingly through the remainder of this decade: the international financial picture, particularly the implications of significant debt for political stability in Third World countries; terrorism; narcotics; technology transfer; foreign industrial technology developments with significant national security implications for the US; problems of instability and insurgency; problems associated with the economic, military and political decline of our traditional allies; developing a foreign intelligence capabilities analytical unit in the Directorate of Intelligence; and a number of other issues that have emerged in recent years.

Associated with strengthening the Directorate to meet both longstanding and new substantive challenges, has been the need to improve the quality of the Directorate's work. Again, without focusing in too much detail on matters I have discussed before with this Committee, this effort has included a much more aggressive training program for Directorate analysts, broader travel and opportunities for extended stays in overseas posts, greater participation in outside sponsored conferences and seminars and other measures to get analysts out from behind their desks and talking to specialists and experts elsewhere in the government and outside of government on the whole range of issues with which we are concerned. Some figures underscore the strength of our commitment to exposing analysts to non-CIA

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specialists and different perspectives as well as to other means of improving our work.

-- In FY 83, nearly 900 analysts participated in some 330 outside conferences and seminars

-- DI analysts made 540 trips abroad in connection with research projects and for area familiarization.

-- More than 700 analysts engaged in some form of outside supplementary training.

-- More than 120 DI military analysts participated in a dozen specialized military courses sponsored by the Department of Defense.

-- Nearly 50% of DI analysts are involved in full or part-time language training.

-- We now conduct 8 separate, full time courses in CIA for experienced analysts.

We also are experimenting now with competitive analytic efforts sponsored by the Directorate but involving joint teams of insiders and outsiders to examine specific problems such as Mexico and to present alternatives to the Agency's traditional analysis. These efforts have been combined with a significantly

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more rigorous effort within the Directorate to present alternative scenarios and to review and evaluate our work.

II. Our program is also aimed at preparing us to take advantage of new collection capabilities -- which, as you realize, are substantial. As I observed in the Community statement, the information available to intelligence analysts has tripled in the last seven years. It will triple again by 1988 and we believe it will triple once more between then and the early '90s. I elaborated all the new systems and capabilities, and suggested some of the enormous implications for analysis.

In sum, the multi-year DI modernization program is an effort to cope with the need to restore valuable capabilities that we once possessed, to continue improving our work, to position ourselves to deal with a wide range of new requirements, and to exploit the flow of information the new systems will produce. In FY-85, in a period when the Intelligence Community will be spending [redacted] on collection, the Directorate of Intelligence is asking for [redacted]

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Our Strategy

Our strategy to deal with these needs has centered on a new organization, additional resources, and an intensive effort to improve the quality of our work.

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-- The regional organization of the Directorate instituted in late 1981 is maturing. We are making steady progress in integrating political, economic, and military elements of our analysis and in developing long range research programs that enable us to identify future problems for US policymakers as well as provide more in-depth analysis of existing issues and problems.

-- In terms of new resources, the Directorate added 25X1
positions in FY-83 and positions in FY-84. We 25X1
successfully recruited against the new positions in FY-
83 and ended the year 25X1
under our authorized
strength. We are devoting considerable energy in the
Directorate to recruitment and I expect we will enjoy
continued success -- although, to be frank, the reduced
appeal of government service and our specialized needs
are requiring us to work much harder to get good
people. Funds available for travel, training and
external analysis also were significantly increased. We
have made a major commitment to modernization of our
computer capability and now have some 300 SAFE terminals
installed. We are placing heavy reliance on the use of
ADP in order to cope with the increasing amounts of data
that will be generated by the new collection systems
and, as our requests for new analysts drop substantially
in FY-86 and beyond, we will be focusing on improvements

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in data handling and processing through computers. We must have the computer hardware and software that will allow our analysts to manage these data flows more efficiently and accurately.

-- In terms of quality, I believe we are making steady progress although the road back is sometimes a hard one. People are generally familiar with the outflow of officers from the clandestine service during the late 1970s. What is less familiar is the degree to which the same exodus affected the Directorate of Intelligence. One statistic underscores the nature of the problem: half of the analysts in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence have less than five years' experience. Many of the new people are of extraordinarily high quality. While the quality of the new people is high, it will take most of them time to gain experience and skill. We are giving them our equivalent of combat experience at the same time we are trying to rejuvenate and improve the skills and capabilities of our more experienced analysts. Finally, particularly during this period when we have so many relatively new analysts, we are relying to a greater extent than in the past on experienced experts in the private sector to help us. These efforts, combined with the measures I have reported before to this Committee to improve our quality, have had a positive impact.

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The FY-85 Request

The Directorate of Intelligence FY-85 proposed program represents the last substantial increment in personnel in the multi-year plan to strengthen the Agency's analytic capability to meet the challenges of the 1980s and 1990s. The program requests

25X1 [] additional positions for a total Directorate strength of

[] We are asking for a total of [] to fund this 225X1

program. I will not go through the program in detail inasmuch as the program description in the Congressional Budget Justification Book provides that information, but I would like to highlight the skills for which we are looking. Specifically, we are asking for

[] economists (more than half for USSR/EE), [] weapons analysts, 25X1

[] ADP specialists, [] military analysts, [] area specialists, [] 25X1

imagery analysts and [] econometrician/methodologists. The remaining [] positions reflect the need to address the vital 25X1 infrastructure requirements that have been ignored in some instances for almost 20 years. These include secretaries, intelligence assistants, cartographers, graphics specialists, statisticians and training support. The new analysts will strengthen our work on Soviet defense industries, weapons analysis, economic ties between Eastern Europe and the USSR, technology transfer, Soviet space programs, problems facing our traditional allies, nuclear proliferation, Western defense industries, and largely complete the staffing of our organizations working on the Third World.

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The Results

One way of suggesting what will come of these additional resources is to look at what has been achieved with the resources the Administration and the Congress already have given the Directorate in recent years. We made available nearly a year ago the research program for 1983 for the Directorate. I can report to you that from that program over 850 research projects were completed or between 85% and 90% of the program -- and this at a time when substantial resources in both our Near Eastern and African/Latin American offices were being diverted to work on the continuing crisis in Lebanon and the conflict in Central America. During 1983, the Directorate published over 650 hardcover assessments, some 5,000 current intelligence items, more than 300 memoranda responding to policymaker requests as well as a variety of serial publications including international economic and energy review, the terrorism review, monthly publications from the regional offices, the Afghan situation report, the international financial biweekly, and many others. I might add that in 1983, we provided nearly 500 briefings and special responses to the Congress, along with nearly 5,000 pieces of finished intelligence -- not including serial or current intelligence documents.

Policymakers and the Congress are turning to us more and more often for more and more information and analysis. The

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number and scope of demands on us have increased staggeringly in the last few years. Even so, we cannot assimilate and you could not be expected to support indefinite personnel growth. We are trying therefore to plan for maximum flexibility within a ceiling of [] people -- the remaining [] to be added slowly through FY 88. This, and continued upgrade of our ADP capability, I believe will give us the capability and flexibility to deal with present and anticipated requirements and new collection assets.

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17 Aug 84

Registry

Please send this statement by Robert Gates to the SSCI on on 28 Feb 84
on the Budget, as Chairman of the NID and DDI to DI/Planning Staff,

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